The Effect of Network Adoption Subsidies: Evidence from Digital Traces
  in Rwanda by Björkegren, Daniel & Karaca, Burak Ceyhun
The E￿ect of Network Adoption Subsidies: Evidence from
Digital Traces in Rwanda
Daniel Björkegren∗
dan@bjorkegren.com
Brown University
Providence, RI
Burak Ceyhun Karaca
Keystone Strategy
New York City
karacaburakceyhun@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Governments spend billions of dollars subsidizing the adoption
of di￿erent goods. However, it is di￿cult to gauge whether those
goods are resold, or are valued by their ultimate recipients. This
project studies a program to subsidize the adoption of mobile
phones in one of the poorest countries in the world. Rwanda subsi-
dized the equivalent of 8% of the stock of mobile phones for select
rural areas. We analyze the program using 5.3 billion transaction
records from the dominant mobile phone network. Transaction
records reveal where and how much subsidized handsets were ul-
timately used, and indicators of resale. Some subsidized handsets
drifted from the rural areas where they were allocated to urban
centers, but the subsidized handsets were used as much as handsets
purchased at retail prices, suggesting they were valued. Recipients
are similar to those who paid for phones, but are highly connected
to each other. We then simulate welfare e￿ects using a network de-
mand system that accounts for how each person’s adoption a￿ects
the rest of the network. Spillovers are substantial: 73-76% of the
operator revenue generated by the subsidy comes from nonrecipi-
ents. We compare the enacted subsidy program to counterfactual
targeting based on di￿erent network heuristics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Governments and NGOs spend substantial resources distributing
subsidies and in kind transfers. A large literature considers the
structure of these distributions: whether they reach intended re-
cipients [1, 2], whether they are used [11], and how they compare
to cash transfers [12]. But what we know about these programs
comes primarily from surveys or administrative records, which
tend to gather coarse measures using small samples. This paper
studies a government handout that was unique in that the good
provided automatically and anonymously recorded a rich stream
of data about how, and by whom, it was ultimately used.
In particular, governments spend billions of dollars to connect
poor and rural consumers to communication networks [16, 18]. A
common program is to subsidize the adoption of either basic hand-
sets, or smartphones (such as a program to provide smartphones to 5
million people in the Indian state of Chhattisgarh [17]). Subsidizing
adoption can theoretically improve welfare because network goods
generate spillovers [20]. Adoption bene￿ts not only one’s contacts:
by in￿uencing their adoption, it also bene￿ts others further away
in the network. But there is little evidence on the e￿ectiveness of
these programs. [16] suggest handset subsidies could be bene￿cial
based on aggregate price elasticities. But operator groups suggest
that these funds are not well spent and universal access goals would
be better served by eliminating them, and lowering taxes [18].
We study an adoption program implemented by the Rwandan
government that allocated 53,352 handsets to rural areas, 8% of the
stock of handsets at the time in 2008. We use data from 5.3 billion
transaction records from Rwanda’s dominant mobile phone opera-
tor. To our knowledge, this represents the ￿rst impact evaluation
of a handset adoption subsidy in a developing country.1
While handsets were allocated to rural areas, cell tower locations
reveal that many handsets found their way to urban centers. The
data has separate identi￿ers for handsets and accounts, making
it possible to trace ownership of the handset. Many handsets are
handed o￿ from rural to urban accounts, and several pass through
‘middleman’ accounts that brie￿y use the handsets in the rural areas
before passing them on. We interpret this as evidence that many
handsets were resold. The records also capture how the handsets
were ultimately used: the ultimate recipients of the handsets used
them in a similar manner to individuals who paid market prices for
their phones, suggesting the handsets were not wasted.
The welfare impacts of the program depend on how recipients’
adoption a￿ected the entire network of potential adopters. Demand
for classical network goods has been di￿cult to quantify: a person
1In the U.S., there is a literature on the LifeLine service subsidy for rural consumers
[10, 15]
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may adopt after a contact adopts because the contact provides net-
work bene￿ts, or because they have similar traits or are exposed to
similar environments. To gauge the welfare e￿ects of the observed
and counterfactual dispersals, we use the method to estimate and
simulate demand for mobile phones in Rwanda developed in [6].
That paper overcomes simultaneity in consumer adoption decisions
by inferring the value generated by each connection from subse-
quent interaction across that connection. Calls are billed by the
second, so a subscriber must value a connection at least as much
as the cost of calls placed across it. Variation in prices and cover-
age identi￿es the underlying utility of communication across each
link. Consumers choose when to adopt, by weighing the increasing
stream of utility from communicating with the network against
the declining cost of handsets. In equilibrium, each individual re-
acts directly to any policy change, and to each other’s responses,
capturing e￿ects that ripple through the network.
We use this method to determine how Rwanda’s 2008 rural adop-
tion subsidy program a￿ected the network. We ￿nd that a substan-
tial fraction of the subsidy’s impact arises from spillover impacts
on nonrecipients. The subsidy improved welfare.
We then compare the performance of the implemented program
against alternatives that use full network information, and heuris-
tics that can be implemented without network information. Switch-
ing to vouchers, where current subscribers are given a discount they
pass along to their strongest unsubscribed contact, would improve
welfare but would change the geographical distribution of bene￿ts.
Related Work
Our work builds on several literatures.
A literature in development economics considers the targeting
of subsidized goods, typically to the neediest households [2].
Our paper is related to work that learns about societies through
records from mobile phone networks, which have been used to
predict wealth [9], and creditworthiness [8]. [22] uses this type
data to predict the adoption of mobile money among phone users.
Our study advances in two ways. First, we show how one can study
the impact of a particular policy by combining knowledge of what
happened on the ground, with rich details in these records that have
not typically been examined in this literature (such as the sequence
of accounts linked to each handsets). Second, we use a structural
model to determine the impact of the implemented program, and
counterfactual programs.
We use the Rwandan mobile network adoption model of [6],
which in that papers is used to assess the impact of taxes and rural
tower construction. It is related to the model of [23] which evaluates
how the seeding of adoption in a videoconferencing network a￿ects
adoption within a ￿rm.
A related literature considers how in￿uence di￿uses through a
network [3–5, 13, 21], and typically seeks to maximize di￿usion.
However, maximizing di￿usion may not be optimal if consumers do
not internalize the social bene￿ts or costs of adoption. The network
demand system we use accounts for the social bene￿ts of each
node’s adoption.
This study shows how passively collected data can evaluate the
impact of policy, in one of the most data poor settings on earth.
2 BACKGROUND
Rwanda is a small, landlocked country in East Africa. It is predomi-
nantly rural; most households live o￿ of subsistence farming. The
country’s experience with mobile phones is similar to that of other
sub-Saharan African countries, though Rwanda is less developed:
per capita consumption in 2005 was $265, while the World Bank
reported a sub-Saharan African average of $545 [25] (all ￿gures
reported in real 2005 USD).
We focus on Rwanda during the period 2005-2009, during which
the network was expanding. Because the Rwandan regulator re-
stricted entry, the market during this period was concentrated: the
mobile operator whose data we use held above 88% of the market,
and its records reveal nearly the entirety of the country’s remote
communication. There are few alternatives for remote communi-
cation: the ￿xed line network is small (with penetration below
0.4%), and mail service is insigni￿cant.2 During this period, almost
all phones were basic phones used primarily for calling; mobile
internet and mobile money were not available.
2008 Adoption Subsidy Program
Like many countries, the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority
collects 2% of all operator revenues into a Universal Access Fund,
to be used to for programs that accelerate Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICTs). In one of these programs, the
Rwandan government in 2008 purchased 53,352 handsets (amount-
ing to roughly 8% of the country’s stock of handsets at the time)
and distributed them to individuals through local governments
at a reduced price. Fifteen of 30 districts participated in the pro-
gram. Handsets were generally allocated to rural districts with low
baseline mobile phone adoption (in participating districts, 4% of
households had mobile phones, versus 12% in nonparticipating dis-
tricts). Districts that were allocated handsets received enough for
between 1% and 15% of households. The handsets were all the same
model, the Motorola C113, which was chosen because it was low
cost and had a long battery life.
Each district handled its own distribution; generally, individuals
came to the district o￿ce to add their name to a list, and then
received the handset a few months later. Bene￿ciaries were to pay
a fraction of the full price of the handset ($28) through monthly
repayments of $1.81, but few of these payments were made.
3 DATA
This project uses several data sources:3
Call detail records (CDR): We use anonymous call records
from the dominant Rwandan operator, capturing nearly every call
made over 4.5 years by the operator’s mobile phone subscribers,
growing from approximately 300,000 in January 2005 and to 1.5
million in May 2009. The data contains a list of transactions that can
be represented as tuples: (C,⌘, 8, 9, ;8 , ; 9 ,3), where C is the timestamp,
⌘ is the handset identi￿er, 8 is the account placing the call (an
anonymized identi￿er corresponding to a phone number), 9 is the
account receiving the call, ;G is the location of the tower used to
2The average mail volume per person was 0.2 pieces per year in Rwanda, relative to
2.4 pieces in Kenya and 538.8 pieces in the US (Sources: National Institute of Statistics
Report 2008, Communications Commission of Kenya, U.S. Postal Service 2011, U.S.
Census).
3See [6] for more details about data sources.
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Table 1: Allocation of Subsidized Handsets by District
Mean by District p-val
Household Allocated Not of
Properties Handsets Allocated Di￿.
Rural 0.94 0.73 0.04
Consump per capita $204 $334 0.03
Handsets alloc Total 3556.8 0 0.00
Per HH 0.05 0.00 0.00
Own phone 2005 0.04 0.12 0.07
2010 0.40 0.47 0.17
Increase 0.36 0.36 0.76
# 15 15
Sources: Banque Rwandaise de Developpement, NISR EICV.
transmit G 0B end of the call, and 3 is the duration. We use this data
to identify subsidy recipients, measure how they are connected to
each other and to the rest of the network, and measure their usage
of the subsidized handset.4
Coverage:We create a baseline coverage map by computing the
areas within line of sight of the towers operational in each month,
a method suggested by the operator’s network engineer. Elevation
maps are derived from satellite imagery recorded by NASA [14, 19].
Handset prices:We create a monthly handset price index based
on 160 popular models in Rwanda, weighting each model by the
quantity activated on the network.
4 HOWWERE HANDSETS ALLOCATED?
We ￿rst assess targeting of the 2008 Rwandan rural handset subsidy.
4.1 Findings from administrative records
Handsets were originally allocated to poor, rural districts.
Districts that were allocated handsets shaded in Figure 1, and their
characteristics shown in Table 1. Handsets were generally allocated
to rural districts with low baseline mobile phone adoption. Alloca-
tions varied signi￿cantly: those allocated handsets received enough
for between 1% and 15% of households.
However, administrative data provides only a coarse understand-
ing of the implementation of the policy. This particular policy can
be investigated in much greater detail using digital traces from the
objects that were given out.
4.2 Findings from digital traces
We infer which handsets are subsidized by the model, de￿ning
BD1B (⌘) 2 {0, 1}. The particular model (Motorola C113) was oth-
erwise rare in the country at the time, so we are able to identify
bene￿ciaries based on receiving this model of handset during the
4Some months of data are missing; from the call records: May 2005, February 2009,
and part of March 2009, and from the billing records: October 2006 and the months
following August 2008.
dates of distribution. Figure 2 shows activations of this model over
time, showing a spike at the time of the subsidy.5 We consider an
account as subsidized if its mode handset was the subsidized model,
and it was activated during the ￿rst four months of 2008. (We omit
handsets activated later because in later months it is di￿cult to tell
if they are part of the program. These are held ￿xed in simulations,
which will tend to lower our estimates of impact.) This gives us
41,225 accounts, 77% of the proposed allocation.
Many handsets were activated in cities, not the rural areas
they were allocated. Figure 1 plots where handsets were allocated
based on government records, as well as the number of subsidized
handsets activated at each tower. While many handsets were ac-
tivated in rural areas that received allocations, many also were
activated in cities.
Anumber of handsets passed throughmiddlemenon their
way to urban areas. The data include signals of resale. One may
see a particular handset ⌘ activated by a phone number 8 but subse-
quently passed along to phone number 8 0. Or, 8 0may be amiddleman
who brie￿y uses the handset for testing, and then transfers it to an
ultimate user 8 00. We de￿ne a middleman as an account 8 0 that uses
two or more subsidized handsets ⌘ for 20 or fewer transactions in
between two other accounts. We ￿nd 624 subsidized handsets were
transferred through 291 middlemen.
Subsidized handsets that were activated were used, not
wasted. A common concern with subsidies is that goods may be
allocated to consumers who do not value them. Because every
transaction on handsets can be observed, we can assess this di-
rectly. Subsidy recipients use handsets in a similar manner as those
who purchased phones around the same time. Table 2 shows that
the ultimate recipients of subsidized handsets (column 3) use their
phones less than individuals who subscribed earlier (column 1), but
on par with individuals who paid retail for phones around the same
time (column 2), in terms of calls, durations, and total number of
contacts. (This is similar to [11]’s ￿nding that subsidizing bednets
did not a￿ect the extent to which they are used.) Subsidized phones
are ultimately used in more rural areas. Results are suggestive of a
program that increased the supply of handsets in rural areas, with
handsets ultimately being used by relatively typical users.
Social networks are similar between those who received
subsidies and those who purchased phones at retail.We ana-
lyze the social network structure of recipients, as revealed by their
later phone calls. We observe the communication graph ⌧) , where
a directed link 8 9 2 ⌧) indicates that phone number 8 has called 9
by the last period of data, ) (May 2009).
Table 3 shows the properties of these edges. The ￿rst column
presents the properties of edges in the entire network of subscribers.
On average, 0.26 calls are placed per month, with a total dura-
tion that averages to 7.63 seconds. The average edge connects sub-
scribers who are 30 km apart. 28% of edges only have calls during
working hours. Most calls are short: 78% of edges have only had
calls under 1 minute, and 51% have only had calls under 30 seconds.
The second two columns restrict these measures to subsidy recipi-
ents: ￿rst, edges from recipients to any subscriber, and second, only
5We de￿ne activation as the ￿rst transaction transmitted by the handset on the phone
network.
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Figure 1: Handset Subsidy: Allocations and Activations
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Rwandaise de Developpement. Points represent the location of cell phone towers where subsidized handsets were ￿rst used. Motorola C113 handsets activated after January 2008 are considered distributed by
the subsidy program.
Table 2: Usage comparison
Accounts Accounts Subsidy Recipients
All Adopting 1-5.2008 Adopting 1-5.2008
Number 1,503,369 309,379 41,225
Rural Mean 0.44 0.54 0.76
SD 0.50 0.50 0.43
Calls Mean 40.0 37.5 37.7
per month Median 24.1 26.1 28.7
SD 59.0 48.9 34.0
Duration Mean 27.6 18.1 16.4
minutes per month Fraction to accounts subscribing after 1.2008 24% 33% 35%
SD 92.2 47.1 23.0
Number of Contacts Mean 105.8 57.5 62.2
(Degree) SD 159.9 73.4 42.8
Clustering Coe￿cient Mean 0.068 0.081 0.082
SD 0.066 0.070 0.057
Rural is de￿ned as an account’s mode tower being located in a rural area
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Figure 2: Activations of Motorola C113
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Table 3: Edge Properties
Subset of Nodes: All Subsidy Recipients
Edges: All All Within
Calls per month 0.26 0.32 0.36
Duration per month 7.63 7.50 8.02
Distance (km) 30.13 29.56 20.02
Any calls during
...workday 0.59 0.60 0.58
...weekend 0.49 0.50 0.50
...late night 0.08 0.07 0.08
...holidays 0.28 0.22 0.21
Only calls during
...workday 0.28 0.27 0.24
Call length
...all under 30 seconds 0.51 0.57 0.55
...all under 1 minute 0.78 0.84 0.80
Nodes 1,503,675 41,225 41,225
Edges 195.6m 4.4m 0.4m
Average for the edges in the given subgraph, from January 2008 on.
edges that connect two recipients. Edges connect subsidy recipi-
ents at shorter distances (average of 20 km) but otherwise these
relationships appear similar to general calling relationships.
Subsidy recipients are connected to each other. Among the
entire population, 2% of links are with subsidy recipients. Subsidy
recipients themselves are nearly 5 times more connected to each
other: 9% of the links of subsidy recipients are to other subsidy
recipients, as shown in the last row of Table 3.
The people reached by the program are unlikely to gener-
ate the most network spillovers. An optimal subsidy program
to maximize network spillovers would target people who would in-
crease the bene￿t of the system to others who have yet to subscribe.
One measure of these bene￿ts is the eventual duration spoken with
contacts that have yet to subscribe. This measure is very similar for
recipients and nonrecipients (35% for subsidy recipients, 33% for all
subscribing in the same months, as shown in Table 2).6 The fraction
of a node’s neighbors who are themselves connected (clustering
6Subsidy recipients represent 13% of those subscribing in these months.
coe￿cient) is very similar: 0.082 for subsidy recipients and 0.081
for all subscribing in the same months.
5 IMPACTS
The ultimate impact on network adoption and welfare depends
on the interaction of the recipients’ adoption decision with the
network of bene￿t ￿ows. [6] estimates a network demand system
for the Rwandan mobile phone network, using the same data. We
use this structural model to simulate how equilibrium adoption
would change under alternate subsidy programs, accounting for
how a change to one individual’s adoption a￿ects others, which
recursively a￿ect others.
5.1 Model
We brie￿y describe the empirical model of handset adoption that
we use from [6]. For more details, see that paper. The utility of
owning a phone is derived from making calls, so we begin with a
model of usage.
5.1.1 Usage. Let (C be the subset of nodes subscribing in month C .
At each period C , individual 8 can call any contact 9 that currently
subscribes, 9 2 ⌧)8 \ (C , to receive utility D8 9C . Each month, 8 draws
a communication shock n8 9C ⇠  8 9 representing a desire to call
contact 9 . Given the shock, 8 chooses a total duration 3   0 for that
month, solving:
D8 9C = max
3 0
E8 9 (3, n8 9C )   28 9C3
where E (3, n) represents the bene￿t of making calls.
The per-second cost of placing a call is 28 9C = ?C+V2>E4A064q8Cq 9C ,
which depends on the calling price ?C as well as the hassle of
placing a call when coverage is imperfect (8’s coverage at time C
is q8C 2 [0, 1], the fraction of the area surrounding his most used
locations receiving coverage in month C ).
We model the bene￿t of making calls as:
E8 9 (3, n) = 3   1n

3W
W
+ U3
 
where the ￿rst term represents a linear bene￿t and the second
introduces decreasing marginal returns. W > 1 controls how quickly
marginal returns decline. U is a cost-dependent censoring parameter
that controls the intercept of marginal utility, and thus a￿ects the
fraction of months for which no call is placed.
The expected utility 8 receives from being able to call 9 in time
period C is given by:
⇢D8 9 (?C ,5C ) =
π 1
n8 9C

3 (n,?C ,5C ) ·
✓
1
V2>BC
⇣
1   U
n
⌘
  ?C   V2>E4A064q8Cq9C
◆
  1
V2>BC n
3 (n,?C ,5C )W
W
 
3 8 9 (n )
where 5C represents the vector of coverage for all individuals.
5.1.2 Adoption. The utility of having a phone in a given period
is given by the utility of communicating with contacts that have
phones: each month 8 is on the network, he receives expected utility:
⇢D8C =
’
9 2⌧8\(C
⇢D8 9 (?C , 5C ) + [8
Dra￿, ,
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where D8 9C represents calls from 8 to 9 (which 8 pays for and thus
values by revealed preference). Individual 8 chooses when to adopt
by weighing the discounted stream of these bene￿ts against the
declining price of a handset, which is represented by the price index
?⌘0=3B4CC . Then, 8 considers the utility of adopting at time g to be:
* g8 =
1’
C=g
XC⇢D8C (?C , 5C )   Xg?⌘0=3B4Cg
5.1.3 Network Adoption Equilibrium. There is some initial set of
adopters (0; their decisions are held ￿xed. Each other individual 8
decides on an adoption time g8 2
⇥
1, ..., )¯
⇤
to maximize his payo￿
* g88 (3⌧8 ), which depends on his contacts’ adoption decisions (3⌧8 ).
An equilibrium corresponds with a Nash equilibrium of the game
where each individual simultaneously announces their adoption
date g8 at the beginning of time (a complete information static game).
Speci￿cally, an equilibrium   is de￿ned by adoption dates 3 =
[g8 ]82( such that the adoption date of each individual 8 2 (\(0 is op-
timal given their contacts’ adoption dates: g8 = argmaxC * C8 (3⌧8 ).
Under this model, each individuals’ adoption and usage depend
on the adoption decisions of his contacts, which in turn depend on
the adoption decisions of her contacts, and so on. A perturbation of
utility that causes one individual to change their adoption date can
shift the equilibrium, inducing ripple e￿ects through potentially
the entire network.
5.1.4 Estimation. The parameters of the model are estimated from
data in [6]. Individuals choose when to adopt a mobile phone and,
if they adopt, how to use the phone. The decision to use a phone
directly reveals the value of each connection, overcoming tradi-
tional issues with identifying the value of network goods solely
from the decision to adopt. Speci￿cally, call decisions identify the
call shock distributions ( 8 9 ), the shape of the utility function (W and
U), and how usage responds to costs (monetary V2>BC and the hassle
of imperfect coverage V2>E4A064 ). The adoption decision identi￿es
bounds on idiosyncratic preferences for having a phone, [[8 , [¯8 ].
The standard upper bound of the value [¯8 computed from [6]
would suggest that recipients value phones somuch that theywould
have adopted at the exact same month regardless of the subsidy.
Because that bound is not very informative, and because subsidy
recipients are observably similar to nonrecipients who subscribed
in the same months, we consider upper bounds [¯2><?0A01;48 that
are set to equal this group of nonrecipients on average.7
5.1.5 Simulation. We use the iterated best response method de-
veloped in [6] to ￿rst simulate adoption and usage in the baseline
environment, and then in counterfactual environments.
We make four assumptions about subsidy recipients:
• In the baseline, all eligible individuals took up the subsidy8
7For nonrecipients, the comparable upper bound [¯2><?0A01;48 is set to the upper
bound [¯8 ; for recipients it is set to a weighted average of the upper and lower
bound:[¯2><?0A01;48 = 0[8 + (1   0)[¯8 . we set the weight 0 so that the av-
erage of [¯2><?0A01;48 coincides with the average of [¯8 for nonrecipients: 0 =Õ
82(D=BD1B0801 0805 [¯8 /#D=BD1B0801 0805 
Õ
82(BD1B [¯8 /#BD1BÕ
82(BD1B [8 /#BD1B 
Õ
82(BD1B [¯8 /#BD1B
.
8Given the decentralized nature of the implemented subsidy program, it is di￿cult to
determine the entire set of individuals who were eligible. Since the subsidy was very
attractive, we assume that all eligible individuals took up the subsidy and that it was
valid only in the month they adopted.
• Recipients did not delay adoption to wait for the subsidy
• Recipients preferred taking the subsidy at the point of adop-
tion to purchasing any time in the following 4 years
• Each recipient made an average of 5 payments, so that the
program represented a discount of $18.94 (based on conver-
sations with the bank ￿nancing the program)
5.2 Actual Subsidy Program
In Table 4 we compute the baseline simulation (“with subsidy” in the
table), as well as simulations where the subsidy has been removed.
The ￿rst captures only the immediate e￿ect of removing the subsidy:
we allow each recipient to reoptimize their decision individually,
without allowing those changes to ripple through the network
(“proximal e￿ect of removal”). The second is the equilibrium that
results after all nodes have adjusted their decisions (“Total Impact
of the Subsidy”); we also break out the incremental impact of the
ripple e￿ects (“additional ripple e￿ect”). The ￿rst column shows the
results for all nodes; subsequent columns show results for subsidy
recipients and nonrecipients.
Because the decision to purchase a subsidized good only loosely
reveals how much the recipient values it, the bounds we obtain are
wide. The upper bound presents an optimistic scenario: targeted
individuals would have delayed adoption by 2 months on average
in the absence of the subsidy. The lower bound presents a more pes-
simistic scenario: targeted individuals would have delayed adoption
by an average of 7 months.
We ￿nd:
The subsidy improved welfare. Factoring in the net present
cost of the subsidy of $0.63m, it shifted the bounds on net welfare
upward $2.7m (lower equilibrium) and $0.4m (upper equilibrium),
a social rate of return of at least 51%.9
Asubstantial fraction of bene￿ts accrued tononrecipients.
Recipients’ utility increased by $0.79m (lower) or $0.63m (upper),
from the combination of increased calling and the direct value of the
discount. Nonrecipients only received utility from increased calling,
but obtained 63% of all consumer surplus in the lower equilibrium
and 23% in the upper equilibrium, due to spillovers.
Itmay have been pro￿table for the operator to￿nance the
subsidy itself. If in absence of the subsidy, the targeted individuals
would have substantially delayed adoption, it would have been
pro￿table for the ￿rm to subsidize their adoption itself. If the ￿rm
had ￿nanced the subsidy, the bounds on its pro￿ts would shift
upward by $0.25m in the lower equilibrium, but downward by
$0.62m in the upper equilibrium.
Nonrecipients account formost of the increase in revenue.
Nonrecipients account for 76% of the revenue from the subsidy
in the low equilibrium and 73% in the comparable upper. In this
setting, the operator has a near monopoly, and so would be able to
internalize revenue generated by nearly all nodes on the network.
Financing a subsidy would have been much less attractive for a
competitor that was less able to internalize revenue from the rest
of the network (related to [7]).
9These results consider the portion of the subsidy allocated only to the 41,225 individ-
uals we can clearly identify as recipients. The subsidy for the other 12,127 handsets
would have represented an additional net present cost of $159,130. In the most ex-
treme case where this value was destroyed through misallocation, this cost should be
subtracted from the welfare gains.
The E￿ect of Network Adoption Subsidies: Evidence from Digital Traces in Rwanda
Dra￿, ,
Table 4: Impact of Adoption Subsidy Program
All nodes Recipients Nonrecipients
Number 1,503,670 41,225 1,462,445
Adoption Time (mean) with subsidy [24.10, 23.22] [37.38, 37.38] [23.73, 22.82]
Total Impact of Subsidy -0.26, -0.06 -6.81, -1.97 -0.07, -0.01
... proximal e￿ect of removal -0.17, -0.05 -6.32, -1.86 -0.00, 0.00
... additional ripple e￿ect -0.09, -0.01 -0.50, -0.11 -0.07, -0.01
Revenue with subsidy (million $) [165.07, 173.49] [0.88, 0.90] [164.19, 172.59]
Total Impact of Subsidy 0.88, 0.15 0.21, 0.04 0.67, 0.11
... proximal e￿ect of removal 0.43, 0.10 0.17, 0.03 0.25, 0.06
... additional ripple e￿ect 0.45, 0.05 0.04, 0.01 0.41, 0.04
Consumer Surplus with subsidy (million $) [243.74, 254.55] [2.06, 2.09] [241.68, 252.46]
Total Impact of Subsidy 2.11, 0.82 0.79, 0.63 1.32, 0.19
... proximal e￿ect of removal 1.25, 0.74 0.74, 0.62 0.51, 0.12
... additional ripple e￿ect 0.86, 0.08 0.05, 0.01 0.81, 0.07
Government Revenue with subsidy (million $) [65.13, 68.11] [0.15, 0.15] [64.98, 67.96]
Total Impact of Subsidy -0.26, -0.57 -0.49, -0.60 0.22, 0.04
... proximal e￿ect of removal -0.43, -0.58 -0.50, -0.60 0.08, 0.02
... additional ripple e￿ect 0.16, 0.02 0.02, 0.00 0.15, 0.02
Results in each cell reported for the lower bound and upper bound estimate of the equilibrium. Impacts represent the di￿erence in these bounds. we hold ￿xed the adoption decision
of 6 subsidized nodes that have crossed bounds for [8 . Utility and revenue reported in 2005 U.S. Dollars, discounted at a rate of 0.9 annually. Consumer surplus includes the surplus
utility each individual receives from the call model through May 2009, minus the cost of holding a handset from the time of adoption until May 2009.
Ripple e￿ects were important. Ripple e￿ects account for 51%
(lower equilibrium) or 33% (upper) of the e￿ect on revenue and 41%
(lower) or 10% (upper) of the e￿ect on consumer surplus.
5.3 Alternative Targeting Rules
The actual subsidy program represents one of many potential tar-
geting schemes that the government could have used. This section
evaluates other schemes. We hold ￿xed the subsidy date (January
2008), amount, and number of nodes allocated (41,225) but vary
who receives the subsidy. All schemes allocate the subsidy to nodes
that did not receive the actual subsidy, that had yet to adopt by
January 2008, but that had adopted by the end of the data (May
2009).10
We evaluate theoretical allocations that rely on network infor-
mation that we observe, but which would not have been known at
the time:
• Priority ranks nodes by a given metric, and then allocates
the subsidy in order until the budget is depleted.
• Random selects nodes at random throughout the network.
• Random super cluster selects a highly concentrated cluster of
subsidy recipients. It selects one node at random, all his un-
subscribed eventual contacts, all their unsubscribed eventual
contacts, and so on, until the budget is depleted.
10While the government could also subsidize individuals who do not appear in the
data, we are unable to empirically evaluate the impact of doing so. This could bias our
results downward (if nonadopters are good candidates for subsidization) or upwards
(if the included adopters are better candidates for subsidization, but a government
would not have been able to identify them.
We also evaluate implementable allocations:
• Voucher mimics a common strategy used by tech companies.
A subset of current subscribers are given adoption vouchers
for the subsidy amount that can be passed on.We assume that
each selected subscriber gives this voucher to the contact he
eventually talks the most with but who has yet to subscribe
(his strongest unsubscribed link).
Table 5 reports simulation results from alternate targeting rules.
We report ￿rm revenue, consumer utility, government revenue, and
their sum as net welfare, in the lower and upper bound equilib-
ria. We also report the net e￿ect on government handset revenue
(which combines the cost of the subsidies and resulting di￿erence
in handset tax revenue). For random allocations we simulate from
multiple random draws, and report the mean and standard devia-
tion across draws. Allocations that generate high overall welfare
tend to also generate high welfare for each of its components (￿rm
revenue, consumer utility, and government revenue), so we focus
on the aggregate measure.
Priority allocations are reported in rows 2-7 of Table 5. These use
information based on how individuals eventually use the network,
which would not have been available at the time. Allocations to
individuals with more connections result in higher net welfare than
to those with fewer, and outperform the implemented subsidy. A
di￿erent metric is the fraction of an individual’s contacts who have
adopted - perhaps those with many latent contacts can induce more
to join the network. This turns out not to be the case–there is little
di￿erence between allocating to those who have a high fraction of
contacts that have adopted, and those who have a low fraction.
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Random allocations are reported in rows 8-15 of Table 5. They
outperform the baseline subsidy in the lower equilibrium, but are
outperformed in the higher equilibrium; apart from the random
allocation to rural individuals, which is outperformed in both equi-
libria.
However, vouchers substantially outperform all other allocations,
shown in the last rows of Table 5. We evaluate vouchers given
to recent adopters (adopting December 2007) and early adopters
(adopting January 2005 or prior). Relative to the baseline subsidy,
vouchers given to early adopters improve net welfare by $3.55m in
the low equilibrium and $1.18m in the comparable high equilibrium,
nearly doubling the welfare bene￿ts of the subsidy.
We also consider restricting these allocations to rural or urban
individuals. Urban allocations tend to result in higher net welfare,
which likely results from correlations with network structure, but
may undermine the government’s distributional aims. Next, we
consider the geographic distribution of welfare.
5.4 Distribution of Welfare
Targeting regimes a￿ect net welfare, and also how that welfare
is distributed around the country. Figure 3 shows the geographic
distribution of consumer surplus resulting from the di￿erent sub-
sidies, including net consumer surplus from calls (omitting the
bene￿t of obtaining a handset per se). Although the implemented
subsidy targets rural areas, much of its bene￿ts go to urban centers.
We compare the implemented subsidy to counterfactual voucher
subsidies to early adopters in the following two plots. Relative to
the implemented subsidy, providing vouchers to early adopters in
urban centers (Figure 3b) would raise net welfare but redistribute
surplus from rural districts in the east, north, and southwest to-
wards cities and the center. In contrast, providing vouchers to early
adopters in rural areas (Figure 3c) would have more mixed e￿ects,
and improve surplus in parts of the east.
6 CONCLUSION
This project studies a mobile phone handset subsidy in Rwanda.
Using transaction records after the subsidized handsets has been
activated, we ￿nd that recipients are very connected to each other.
We then use a structural model to simulate the e￿ect of the enacted
subsidy program, and ￿nd that it improved welfare on net. We then
compare the e￿ect of the actual dispersal to that of counterfactual
dispersals.
This type of analysis can make policies and behaviors legible to
centralized authorities [24], which can improve policymaking, but
entails new risks of surveillance. Managing these risks will require
society to have deep, informed conversations about what can be
measured, and how it should be used.
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Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of Consumer Surplus
(a) Implemented Subsidy Relative to No Subsidy:
Relative to Implemented Subsidy:
(b) Voucher to early adopters,
urban
(c) Voucher to early adopters,
rural
Plots show the consumer surplus derived from calls as a result of the subsidy program.
Blue represents higher consumer surplus than the comparison. In the bottom two
plots, red represents lower consumer surplus than the implemented subsidy.
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